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The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals
L

INTRODUCTION

In 1971, Congress created the Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals (TECA)1 to hear appeals from federal district court
decisions arising under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970
(ESA).2 The ESA originally authorized the President to impose emergency wage, price, and rent controls, 3 and later ESA
amendments authorized the President to allocate petroleum
products in emergencies. 4 Although the ESA expired on April
1. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,
§ 211(b) (1)-(2), 85 Stat. 749 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at
586 (1976).
2. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586 (1976). The precedents for
this Act were the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, and
the Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (expired 1953). These
Acts had imposed wartime economic controls. For the history of events leading
to the passage of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and an analysis of its
provisions, see Ginsburg, The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Basic Authority and Sanctions, 9 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 22 (1942).
3. The ESA authorized the President to stabilize wages, prices, and rents
at the levels of May 25, 1970. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91379, § 2002, 84 Stat. 799 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586
(1976). Former President Nixon delegated this authority to the Cost of Living
Council (COLC). Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971), as amended by
Exec. Order No. 11,617, 3 C.F.R. 609 (1971), and superseded by Exec. Order No.
11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971). The COLC delegated its authority to the Office of
Emergency Preparedness. 36 Fed. Reg. 16,215 (1971).
The programs under the ESA went through four phases. Phase I carried
out the "90 day freeze" from August 15 to November 13, 1971. See S. REP. No.
63, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1973), reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1299-1300. Phase H adjusted the frozen wages and price restraints and
lasted from November 14, 1971, to January 10, 1973. Id. at 2, reprinted in [19731
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1300. Phase III involved self-imposed standards
(within fixed limits) that lasted from January 11 to June 12, 1973; a price freeze
from June 13 to August 11, 1973, followed these self-imposed standards. See
COST OF iVING COUNCIL, ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM QUARTERLY REPORT (Apr. 1-June 30, 1973). Phase IV required that controls be lifted from all
industries during the August 12, 1973, to April 30, 1974, period. See Oversight on
Economic Stabilization; HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Productionand Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 455-56 (1974) (statement of John T. Dunlop).
4. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28,
§ 203(a) (3), 87 Stat. 27 (expired 1974), reprintedin 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976).
For the legislative history of these amendments, see S. REP. No. 63, supra note
3, at 2-3, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1300-01.
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30, 1974,5 Congress continued the effect of these ESA amendments by enacting the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of" -.
1973 (EPAA).6 Because the EPAA incorporated the ESA.provisions for judicial review, 7 the TECA currently has appellate jurisdiction of all federal district court cases arising under the
5. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28,
§ 218, 87 Stat. 29, reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976). This expiration did
not affect any pending action or any subsequent action based on any act committed prior to May 1, 1974. Id.
President Nixon continued some of the COLC's operations until December
31, 1974. See Exec. Order No. 11,788, 3 C.F.R. 877 (1974) (providing for orderly
termination of the ESA program and various follow-up activities).
6. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat.
627 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 751 (1976)). The EPAA gave the President
temporary authority to "deal with shortages of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and
refined petroleum products [in order to minimize] the adverse impacts of such
shortages ... on the American people and the domestic economy." Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 26, 87 Stat. 628 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 751(b) (1976)). The President's regulatory authority
under the EPAA expires on September 30, 1981. See 15 U.S.C. § 751(b) (1976).
See Newell v. Federal Energy Administration, 591 F.2d 704, 711 n.19 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1979); 15 U.S.C. § 760g (1976).
President Nixon established the Federal Energy Office (FEO) to issue regulations governing crude oil allocation. Exec. Order No. 11,748, 3 C.F.R. 822
(1973). The FEO was replaced by the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) in
June 1974. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-790h
(1976); Exec. Order No. 11,790, 3 C.F.R. 882 (1974), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 761
note, at 1251 (1976). The FEA was replaced by the Department of Energy
(DOE) in August 1977. Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7131, 7151(a) (Supp. U 1978).
7. See EPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 754(a) (1) (1976). The judicial review provisions
of the amended ESA, as incorporated in the EPAA, provide:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction of cases or controversies arising under this title, or
under regulations or orders issued thereunder, notwithstanding the
amount in controversy; except that nothing in this subsection ...
affects the power of any court of competent jurisdiction to consider, hear,
and determine any issue by way of defense ... raised in any proceeding before such court....
(b) (1) There is hereby created a court of the United States to be
known as the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals ...
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from the district courts of the United States in cases and controversies arising under this title or under regulations or orders issued
thereunder. Such appeals shall be taken by the filing of a notice of appeal with the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals within thirty
days of the entry of judgment by the district court.
(c) In any action commenced under this title in any district court
of the United States in which the court determines that a substantial
constitutional issue exists, the court shall certify such issue to the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. Upon such certification, the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals shall determine the appropriate manner of disposition which may include a determination that the
entire action be sent to it for consideration or it may, on the issue certified, give binding instructions and remand the action to the certifying
court for further disposition.
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ESA or the EPAA.8
In most cases appealed to the TECA, either the only issue
appealed is one clearly arising under the ESA or the EPAA,9 or
the resolution of an issue clearly arising under the ESA or the
EPAA determines the outcome of the litigation, even though
non-ESA or non-EPAA issues are also involved.' 0 In these
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L No. 92-210, § 211, 85
Stat. 748, reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 589-90 (1976).
The creation of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the transfer of Federal Energy Administration (FEA) functions to the DOE, see note 6 supra, did
not abolish TECA jurisdiction over FEA-type DOE actions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7192(a) (Supp. II 1978). Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7192(b) (Supp. II 1978), however, provides the federal district courts with
original jurisdiction of matters arising exclusively under the Department of Energy Organization Act, leaving appellate jurisdiction of these matters to the circuit courts of appeals. See generally Eldns, The Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of JudicialResponsibility, 1978 DuKF
L.J. 113, 115 n.9.
8. See note 7 supra. The TECA has jurisdiction, via certification procedures, of substantial constitutional issues raised in federal district court cases
arising under the ESA/EPAA. See Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211(c), 85 Stat. 749 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12
U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586 (1976); Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,
§ 5(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 754(a) (1) (1976).
The TECA also has original jurisidiction of all civil cases arising under the
Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2, § 10(b), 91 Stat. 4, reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 717 note, at 922 (Supp. II 1978).
9. See, e.g., Twin City Barge & Towing Corp. v. Schlesinger, 603 F.2d 197
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979) (only issue appealed involved validity of Federal
Energy Administration (PEA) orders both granting and denying exception relief from EPAA pricing regulations pertaining to natural gas liquids); Grigsby
v. Department of Energy, 585 F.2d 1069 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (only issue
appealed involved FEA orders ruling that oil producer charged more for oil
than allowed by prices fixed pursuant to EPAA), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979); General Crude Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 585 F.2d 508 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (only issue appealed involved FEA and district court interpretations of "producer" and "refiner" as used in EPAA), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 912 (1979); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 503 F.2d
1060 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (only issue appealed involved timing of appeals raising only ESA natural gas pricing increases issues); Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen v. Cost of Living Council, 497 F.2d 1360 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1974) (only issue appealed involved Cost of Living Council and district
court rulings that negotiated, deferred wage increases violated ESA national
wage standards); Plumbers Local 519 v. Construction Indus. Stabilization
Comm., 479 F.2d 1052 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (only issue appealed involved Construction Industry Stabilization Committee's reduction of negotiated
wage increase because of violation of ESA standards).
10. See, e.g., Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 591 F.2d
711, 716 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (despite common law breach of contract
claims, TECA had exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the case because "the resolution of the litigation in its entirety requires application of the EPAA"), cert.
denied, 100 S.Ct. 168 (1979); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d
1375, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978) (all issues appealed, including breach of contract allegations, were inseparable from issues concerning ESA/EPAA oil pricing regulations), cert. denied,441 U.S. 952 (1979); M. Spiegel & Sons Oil Corp. v. B.P. Oil
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cases, the TECA has decided the entire appeal by deciding the
ESA or EPAA issues. There is, however, a narrow category of
cases in which ESA or EPAA issues are joined on appeal with
non-ESA or non-EPAA issues, and the resolution of the ESA or
EPAA issues in the cases does not dispose of the entire appeal."1 When deciding these cases, both the TECA and the circuit courts have had to determine what issues the TECA may
decide on appeal.
In this narrow category of cases, courts have consistently
limited the TECA's jurisdiction to consideration only of the
ESA or EPAA issues involved. For example, in United States v.
Cooper,12 the TECA refused to hear a criminal count of a multicount appeal. The court reasoned that only the circuit court
of appeals could rule on charges arising under a federal crimiCorp., 531 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1976) ("construction of the EPAA. .. will control the litigation"). See also Municipal Elec. Util. Ass'n v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 485 F.2d 967, 971 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court refused to decide where
appeals would be heard if Federal Power Act issue was inseparable from ESA
questions).
11. See, e.g., Newell v. Federal Energy Administration, 591 F.2d 704 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1979) (TECA ruled on issue regarding applicability of
ESA/EPAA but did not rule on issue of reemployment rights under Federal
Energy Administration Act); Longview Ref. Co. v. Shore, 554 F.2d 1006 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App.) (TECA held to have jurisdiction of whole case involving
ESA/EPAA issues only because district court had dismissed other antitrust
and contractual claims), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977); Spinetti v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 522 F.2d 1401 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (TECA had jurisdiction
only of ESA/EPAA claims and not antitrust, fair trade, and contractual claims
also raised on appeal); Connecticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498
F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (circuit court heard Federal Power Act issues that
TECA had refused to hear); City of Groton v. Federal Power Comm'n, 487 F.2d
927 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (TECA refused to hear Federal Power Act issues but upheld district court ruling that Federal Power Commission order did
not violate ESA); Municipal Elec. Util. Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 485
F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (circuit court considered only contractual issues involving Federal Power Act, leaving TECA to decide the validity of proposed
rate increases and whether Federal Power Commission's refusal to suspend
rate schedules violated ESA or regulations promulgated thereunder); United
States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (TECA disclaimed
jurisdiction of criminal false representation conviction but would have heard
timely appeals of ESA issues); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Laborers
Local 612, 476 F.2d 1388 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (TECA refused to hear appealed collective bargaining issues but did hear appealed ESA issues).
12. 482 F.2d 1393 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973). United States v. Cooperwas
cited with approval in Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 75 (1975) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court did not, however, explicitly approve issue jurisdiction for
the TECA. The court instead emphasized that the contempt charge involved in
the appeal was a "'separate and independent proceeding at law ... to vindicate the authority of the court' and was 'not a part of the original cause."' 423
U.S. at 75, (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445, 451
(1911)). Thus, to date, the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the
proper approach to the TECA's jurisdiction.
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nal statute even though those charges were based on violations
of the ESA and were joined, at trial and on appeal, with ESA
claims. 13 Similarly, in Clark Oil & Refining Co. v. Department
of Energy,14 the TECA held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the only issue actually adjudicated by the district court arose solely under the Department of Energy Act
and not the EPAA even though the plaintiff's only claim for relief arose under the EPAA.15 In other cases the TECA has re13. United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d at 1397-99. Cooper, a landlord, was
charged with willfully and knowingly making false representations about material facts within the jurisdictions of the Department of the Treasury, the IRS,
and the Price Commission. These charges stemmed from violations of rent
controls promulgated pursuant to the ESA. The district court found Cooper liable both civilly (for ESA violations) and criminally (for false representation
and ESA criminal violations), and entered separate civil and criminal judgments against him on separate dates. Id. at 1395. Cooper appealed his criminal
conviction to the Ninth Circuit but did not appeal to the TECA. The Ninth Circuit transferred the entire appeal to the TECA for further proceedings, concluding that sole jurisdiction to review the matter was vested by statute in the
TECA. Id. at 1396.
The TECA held that, even though the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction of the
appeal from the criminal conviction, the circuit court lacked authorization to
transfer all or part of the appeal to the TECA. Id. at 1398. Although the joinder
of the claims at trial was permissible, on appeal the issues should have been
severed. Because timely appeal of the ESA issues was not filed with the
TECA, the TECA lacked jurisdiction to hear even the ESA issues. Id. at 1400.
14. No. DC-53 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979).
15. Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip op. at 10
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979). In Clark, Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.
(Corco) had applied for a grant of exception relief offered under the oil entitlements program-a Department of Energy effort to provide incentives for transporting California crude oil to out-of-state refineries. The Department of
Energy's Office of Hearing Appeals granted relief to Corco in a proposed order.
Id. at 3. Other refiners objected to this proposed order, triggering Department
of Energy proceedings to review the proposed relief. Corco received interim relief so that it could ship oil to Puerto Rican refineries during the pending Department of Energy proceedings. The other refiners appealed the order
granting Corco interim relief to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). Based on regulations issued after these appeals were filed, the FERC
dismissed the appeals, holding that it lacked the statutory authority to review
grants of interim relief. Id. at 4. One refiner filed a complaint in federal district
court alleging that the FERC improperly refused to review the interim order.
The district court held that the FERC had improperly refused to review the order and remanded the case to the FERC. Id. The Department of Energy and
Corco appealed this district court holding to the TECA.
The threshold question on appeal to the TECA was whether the TECA had
jurisdiction over the appeal. The plaintiffs/appellees argued that the adjudicated issue arose solely out of the Department of Energy Act and was outside
the TECA's jurisdiction. Id. at 5. The defendants/appellants argued that, even
though the adjudicated issue arose solely from the Department of Energy Act,
it was part of a larger "case" arising under the EPAA and was therefore within
the TECA's jurisdiction. Id. at 7. The TECA majority accepted the plaintiffs'/appellees' argument and dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The majority rejected the defendants'/appellants' argument that
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fused to hear antitrust, fair trade, and contract claims that were
joined with ESA or EPAA issues on appeal.16
Relying on the familiar tenet that grants of special jurisdiction should be strictly construed,17 most courts have found that
limiting the TECA's jurisdiction to ESA and EPAA issues most
closely conforms with the congressional purpose for creating
the TECA. In Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England
Petroleum Corp.,'8 however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit moved beyond mere reliance on the tenet of strict
construction and provided the most comprehensive analysis to
date of the TECA's jurisdictional grant.19 The court considered
three approaches to allocate appellate jurisdiction between a
federal court of appeals and the TECA when several issues had
been adjudicated by a federal district court in a single case.
First, following the plain language of the TECA's jurisdictional
the TECA has broad jurisdiction based on the nature of the "case" appealed
and failed to accept the dissent's view that an adjudicated procedural issue
arising wholly within an EPAA claim should be heard by the TECA. Id. at 10.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, an appeal from a Florida federal district court that had dismissed an
EPAA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The circuit court
concluded that the TECA had sole jurisdiction of the appeal. Ven-Fuel, Inc. v.
Department of Energy, (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 1979).
16. See Longview Ref. Co. v. Shore, 554 F.2d 1006 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977); Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 522 F.2d 1401
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
17. See, e.g., Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip
op. at 10 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979) ("Jurisdiction is to be strictly
construed."); Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552 F.2d 927, 930 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1977) (Strict construction of statutory grants of jurisdiction is often alluded to in TECA decisions.); United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393, 1398
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) ("[A] loose construction [of the TECA's jurisdictional grant] is unacceptable in light of the traditional rule that courts of special jurisdiction should strictly construe their statutory grants of jurisdiction.").
18. 604 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1979).
19. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. (Coastal States) sued New England Petroleum Corporation (Nepco) for damages resulting from Nepco's alleged
breach of a contract to buy oil from Coastal States. Jurisdiction was based on
diversity of citizenship. Nepco moved to reopen discovery in order to prove
that Coastal States had overcharged Nepco in violation of ESA/EPAA price
controls, thus making the sales contract illegal. Nepco's motion was not
granted and Nepco was found liable for $192,936. Id. at 181.
The Second Circuit remanded the case, permitting Nepco to demonstrate
the illegality of the sales contract. Id. On remand, however, the district court
judge denied all relief requested by Nepco, concluding that the sales transactions were exempt from mandatory price controls and were not illegal. Id.
Nepco appealed the denial of the motions for relief to both the Second Circuit and the TECA. Nepco then obtained a stay of proceedings in the TECA
and moved to have the appeal in the Second Circuit transferred to the TECA,
arguing that section 211(b) (2) of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments
of 1971 granted exclusive jurisdiction of the matter to the TECA. Id.
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grant,20 the TECA could have jurisdiction only of those issues
or cases "arising under" the ESA or EPAA according to the
rules of traditional federal question "arising under" analysis
(arising under jurisdiction). 21 Under this approach, the TECA
would have jurisdiction of ESA or EPAA issues raised in the
22
complaint but not those raised in the answer or counterclaim.
Second, the TECA could have exclusive jurisdiction of all issues appealed from district court cases that had involved any
ESA or EPAA issue, even though the issue was raised as a defense or counterclaim (TECA case jurisdiction).23 Third, the
20. See note 7 supra.
21. The Constitution provides that federal courts may be given jurisdiction
over "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The problem in interpreting this clause

is defining "arising under." There is no consensus on the definition of this
phrase. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17 (3d ed.
1976). Some scholars argue that original federal question jurisdiction exists
only when there is a substantial claim founded directly upon federal law.
Mishin, The Federal "Question"in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L, REV. 157,
165, 168 (1953). See generally Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement
that a Case Arise Directly Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L RE v. 890 (1967);
Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute (Part11), 36 U. CHL
L. REv. 268, 276-79 (1969).
22. Since 1877, the scope of federal question jurisdiction has been narrowed by applying the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which requires that the
federal question appear on the face of the complaint. See Gold-Washing &

Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203 (1877). Thus, no federal question jurisdiction exists if the only federal question raised is in the answer, defense, or counterclaim. Id. Likewise, no federal question jurisdiction exists when a plaintiff
anticipates federal question defenses in his complaint. Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 129 (1974). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 21,
§§ 17-22.
Only the Seventh Circuit has interpreted section 211(b)(2) of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971 as "consistent with interpretations of the same phrase, 'arising under,' in the context of federal question
jurisdiction in the federal courts." St Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Ogilvie, 496 F.2d 1324,
1326 (7th Cir. 1974) (defendant's counterclaim based on ESA grounds did not
make the case appealable to the TECA).
23. The TECA has heard ESA or EPAA issues when raised by counterclaims or answers. See, e.g., Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co.,
591 F.2d 711 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (issues raised by Gulfs counterclaim
clearly arose under EPAA, and TECA would have heard them if timely appeal
to TECA had not been withdrawn), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct 168 (1979); Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1978) (ESA/EPPA issues
raised in counterclaim were properly appealed to TECA), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
952 (1979); Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Caribou Four Corners, Inc., 573 F.2d 1259
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (defendant's answer raised issue of EPAA stripper well exemption and district court made findings of fact on that issue; therefore appeal to TECA was proper). The case approach is commonly argued
before the courts. See, e.g., Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No.
DC-53 (Temp. Emer. Ct.App. Oct. 15, 1979); Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v.
New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393 (Temp. Emer. Ct.App. 1973).
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TECA could have exclusive jurisdiction only of ESA or EPAA
issues raised on appeal, leaving the appropriate court of appeals to decide any non-ESA or non-EPAA issues (TECA issue
jurisdiction). The Coastal States court then described the disadvantages and advantages of each approach:
Each of the three approaches implicates conflicting considerations.
Limiting the TECA to traditional "arising under" jurisdiction makes
applicable a well-developed body of jurisdictional law, yet scatters
among the courts of appeals some ESA issues, raised by way of answer
or otherwise, on which the expertise of the TECA would be helpful.
Giving the TECA "case" jurisdiction assures uniform decision-making
of all ESA issues, yet withdraws from the courts of appeals many nonESA issues, which may really be the dominant issues in the case and
which the TECA may have no interest and no special competence in
deciding. Splitting the cases and giving the TECA only TECA "issue"
jurisdiction assures uniformity of decision-making on all ESA issues
and avoids burdening the TECA with non-ESA issues, yet encounters
confusion inevitably associated with a system of
the risk of delay and
24
bifurcated appeals.

After determining that neither the language creating the TECA
nor its legislative history conclusively defined the TECA's jurisdiction,25 the court turned to existing precedent to resolve the
issue. It rejected "traditional arising under jurisdiction" because courts had not limited the TECA's jurisdiction to issues
raised in the complaint. 26 Case jurisdiction was also ruled out
because the TECA traditionally disclaimed jurisdiction of all
non-ESA or non-EPAA issues.27 The court concluded that is24. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604
F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir. 1979) (footnotes omitted).
25. Congress used the phrase "cases and controversies arising under" in
section 211(b) (2) of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971. The
court considered this strong but not conclusive evidence that the traditional
federal question meaning should also be applied to the words used in the ESA.
Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179,
183 (2d Cir. 1979). The court also noted that Congress did not intend to have all
ESA issues reviewed by the TECA, because the lawmakers did not give federal
district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear state cases raising
ESA issues in defenses. Id. The Second Circuit suggested, however, that federal district court cases in which such issues are raised in answers may be
within the TECA appellate jurisdiction because "important federalism concerns weigh against expanding removal of state court cases, [but] are totally
absent when the only issue is which of two coordinate federal appellate courts
has jurisdiction." Id.
The court also concluded that the legislative history "provides no aid in
resolving the § 211(b) (2) [TECA jurisdiction] issue posed in this case." Id. at
184. The court then considered two legislative reasons for creating the TECAspeed and consistency in decision making. The court determined that consistency would best be obtained by using the issue approach to define the TECA's
jurisdiction, while speed would be better achieved by using either the traditional arising under approach or the case approach. Id.
26. 604 F.2d at 183.
27. See id. at 184-85.
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sue jurisdiction was proper because the existing bifurcated appellate system demonstrated acceptance of the issue
approach. 2 8
This Note critically examines the analysis that courts have
used to confine the TECA's appellate jurisdiction solely to issues concerning the ESA or EPAA and identifies problems inherent in the issue approach. An alternative analysis is then
suggested. The Note proposes that the TECA should be
granted "limited case jurisdiction" under which the TECA
would be required to decide all issues in a case when any ESA
or EPAA issues have been adjudicated by the district court.
Currently, there are proposals before Congress that would create other specialized courts which structurally resemble the
TECA. This Note suggests that Congress carefully define the
jurisdictions of these proposed courts in order to avoid the
problems now facing the TECA.
II.

PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE CURRENT
DEFINITION OF TECA JURISDICTION

Limiting the TECA's jurisdiction to consideration of only
ESA and EPAA issues requires courts to sever the issues in
some appeals so that the circuit court may take appellate jurisdiction of those issues not arising under either the ESA or
EPAA.29 This system of bifurcated appeals often creates
problems for litigants, causes forced decisions, and results in
inefficient judicial administration.
A system of bifurcated appeals can easily confuse litigants
concerning the proper forum for their appeal.3 0 Of course,
28. Id. at 184-87. The court further maintained that the congressional purpose in creating the TECA would not be served if every ESA issue raised, even
if not adjudicated, could be the basis for appeal to the TECA. Thus, the court
ruled that ESA issues must be adjudicated by the district court in order to
form the basis for appeal to the TECA. Id. at 186-87.
The court again recognized that if the TECA's jurisdiction was confined to
ESA or EPAA issues, the phrase "cases and controversies arising under" would
assume a meaning different from that normally associated with those words.
The court, however, justified that difference in two ways. First, the court noted
that there were no comity considerations in this case. Second, the court stated:
Whatever the hazards might be in forecasting whether a federal question will really be in controversy when pleaded in an answer, no similar risks are encountered in routing to a specialized federal appellate
court all issues within its special competence that have actually been
adjudicated in a district court.
Id. at 186.
29. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
30. The best example of this confusion is found in Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 591 F.2d 711 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
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some confusion is unavoidable whenever specialized subject
matter courts are involved since litigants must determine
whether the circuit court or the special court is the proper appellate forum.3 1 The existence of bifurcated appeals makes this
determination of the proper forum even more difficult; litigants
must decide the proper forum for each possible issue on appeal
rather than for the appeal as a whole. Litigants who make this
determination improperly may, in extreme cases, be deprived
of appellate review altogether.3 2 A system of bifurcated ap100 S. Ct. 168 (1979). Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. (Citmoco), sued Gulf Oil
(Gulf) for money damages arising from Gulf's alleged breach of a contract to
buy oil from Citmoco at prices above the maximum ceiling price allowed by the
EPAA. Gulf counterclaimed for the difference between the price charged and
the lawful maximum ceiling price. Citmoco raised a constitutional issue that
the district court refused to certify to the TECA. Citmoco appealed the district
court judgment to both the Fifth Circuit and the TECA. 591 F.2d at 713-14.
Later, Citmoco moved to dismiss its appeal to the TECA. Id. at 715. Although
that motion was granted, Citmoco had requested the dismissal only because
Citmoco was certain that the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal. Id.
The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with directions to
certify to the TECA the constitutional questions raised by Citmoco. The TECA
held that although the controversy could have been heard in the TECA if
timely notice of appeal had been filed there, the Fifth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to order the district court to certify the constitutional question to the
TECA. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the TECA terminated when Citmoco voluntarily withdrew its appeal to the TECA. Id. at 716.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently recognized the problems
associated with bifurcated appeals. See Oklahoma Assoc. of Consumers & Producers v. Fea, No. 79-1847, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. Oct. 23, 1979) ("[Nothing] other
than mass confusion [will be gained] by the promoting of simultaneous circuit
court TECA appeals.").
31. Cases defining the subject matter jurisdiction of the Special Court created by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 701, 719 (1976), also
illustrate this point. See, e.g., In re Erie Lackawanna Ry., 563 F.2d 784 (6th Cir.
1977); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Blanchette, 551 F.2d 127 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977); Stratford Land & Improvement Co. v. Blanchette,
448 F. Supp. 279 (Spec. Ct. 1978); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Illinois, 423 F. Supp.
941 (Spec. Ct.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1976). See also Horton v. Humphrey,
146 F. Supp. 819, 820-21 (D.D.C. 1956) (U.S. district court disclaimed jurisdiction
of import duty question, holding that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
was proper appellate forum), affid, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
The TECA, in Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip
op. at 8-9 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979), acknowledged the confusion
caused by the possibility of dual appellate review. See also Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179, 186 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979).
32. In United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973),
see note 13 supra, Cooper lost his appellate review of the ESA issues in the
case because his appeal to the TECA was untimely and because the TECA
held that the Ninth Circuit's transfer of jurisdiction to the TECA was improper.
482 F.2d at 1400. On these facts, even if Cooper had appealed to the TECA he
would have been forced to decide which court had jurisdiction of the false representation charges that were part of the appeal. According to the TECA's decision, even the Ninth Circuit was unable to properly make this determination.

Id.
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peals may also impose undue hardship on litigants. Undue
hardship may occur when arguments must be made before two
33
different courts which may be located in different cities.
Bifurcated appeals may also cause forced decision making
when the TECA and a circuit court must decide nearly identical but severed issues. For example, at least one circuit court
that was considering issues severed from ESA issues was left
no real choice in making its decision. The court stated:
Apparently, no one called the attention of TECA to the appeals with
which the Tenth Circuit is now concerned.
We find ourselves in an anomalous situation. Appeals have been
taken to both TECA and the Tenth Circuit from the same district court
judgment. Both appeals deal with the same subject, the validity of the
March 13 contract. In TECA the question was compliance with the Economic Stabilization Act. In the Tenth Circuit the question is the authority of Local 612 to make the contract in violation of the rules and
policies of the parent union.
A strange situation exists when two different appellate courts are
An intolerable situareviewing the same district court judgment ....
tion would result if we came out with a different disposition than did
TECA.34

Finally, bifurcated appeals may cause unnecessary and undesirable delay. Even advocates of the issue approach recognize that the ultimate resolution of an appeal will be delayed
when an action in either the circuit court or the TECA must be
stayed pending the decision of related issues in the other
court.3 5 In cases in which the proceedings in the other court
need not be stayed, the parties must still wait until the busier
circuit court resolves its non-ESA or non-EPAA issues before
they can obtain the final disposition of the appeal. Moreover,
the process of allocating jurisdiction between the two courts
may cause delay and inefficient use of judicial resources.36
33. Although the TECA hears cases in the circuit in which the case arose,
the circuit court may hear the same case in a different city. For example,
Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 836 (1974), was heard in Denver, but its companion case, Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Laborers' Local 612, 476 F.2d 1388 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1973), was heard in Oklahoma City.
34. Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133, 139 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
35. The possibility of delay was acknowledged in Coastal States Marketing,
Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179, 186 & n.9, 187 n.10. See also
Newell v. Federal Energy Administration, 591 F.2d 704, 709 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1979) (TECA made no comment on Federal Energy Administration or Department of Energy issues; the proceedings considering these issues had been
stayed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court pending TECA resolution of
ESA/EPAA issues).
36. In Connecticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 993
(D.C. Cir. 1974), the District of Columbia Circuit Court had refused to hear the
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THE ANALYSIS USED TO SUPPORT ISSUE
JURISDICTION

Both the Coastal States analysis and the more typical analysis that courts have used to support the issue approach are
flawed. The Coastal States analysis is faulty because the court
initially restricted its analysis to a choice among the three potential approaches most frequently offered by courts when defining the TECA's jurisdiction, without first carefully grounding
the analysis in the congressional purpose for creating the
TECA.37 As a result, this analysis fails to consider approaches
that may be more consistent with congressional intent.
The more traditional analysis used by other courts is
flawed by rigid adherence to the presumption that "courts of
special jurisdiction should strictly construe their statutory
grants of jurisdiction."38 Application of that presumption is unappealed issues on July 23, 1973, ruling that the TECA was the appropriate forum. Id. at 995. The TECA later refused to hear some of those issues in City of
Groton v. Federal Power Comm'n, 487 F.2d 927, 935 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1973), holding that the District of Columbia Circuit Court was the only proper
appellate forum. The circuit court was then forced to reconsider the issue in
Connecticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1974). Acknowledging the delay and confusion suffered by the parties in this
case, the circuit court announced
the accommodation which will be made in future cases where this
Court is asked to review an order of the Federal Power Commission
raising Federal Power Act issues which appear inextricably interwoven
with [ESA] issues ....
Our course... will be to hold our review in
abeyance until review by the District Court and TECA is completed.
This will permit TECA to dispose of questions uhder the [ESA].
TECA's disposition under Section 211(a) of that Act will clarify what
questions may remain for disposition by this Court under Section
313(b) of the Federal Power Act. This is a common sense accommodation of the two jurisdictional schemes.
Id. at 998.
The TECA disposes of nearly one-third of its cases on jurisdictional
grounds. Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip op. at 2
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979) (Hoffman, J., dissenting). Commentators
recognize that "it would be unjust to litigants to create [a court] in a form
which resulted in a large volume of disputes over its jurisdictional limits. Jurisdictional bickering is the most wasteful kind of litigation, and any cause of
much of this activity is unacceptable." P. CARRiNGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 170 (1976).
37. See 604 F.2d at 182-83. That these are the most frequently urged approaches is evident from case law. See, e.g., Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73
(1975) (per curiam) (Supreme Court rejects unlimited case approach on facts
of case); Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip op. at 910 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979) (case approach urged by counsel but
rejected by TECA); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ogilvie, 496 F.2d 1324, 1326 (7th Cir.
1974) (court uses traditional arising under approach by applying well-pleaded
complaint rule).
38. United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393, 1398 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1973). This rule of statutory construction has been applied frequently by the
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warranted in the context of the TECA. Courts citing the rule of
strict construction emphasize the special expertise and competence of the TECA.39 This suggests that the court's narrow application of the rule stems from a belief that "it is more
desirable to use judges who hear all types of cases than to create a special tribunal with judges who hear only [one] kind of
case." 4 TECA judges, however, are not appointed to serve exclusively on the TECA, but are selected from the federal judiciary to serve on the TECA in a part-time capacity. 41 Because
they serve part-time, they are not likely to develop the "tunnel
TECA. See Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552 F.2d 927, 930 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1977) (applying strict construction rule); Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
522 F.2d 1401, 1403 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (citing strict construction language of Cooper and reiterating rule.) Both Spinetti cases relied on United
States v. California, 504 F.2d 750 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1015 (1975), as precedent for applying the rule. Such reliance, however, is
misplaced. In United States v. California, the TECA strictly construed the
ESA savings clause provisions in order to determine whether the case appealed was within the exceptions of the clause. The TECA stated that "this
contention must be considered in light of [the rule] of statutory construction
[that] jurisdictional statutes are to be strictly construed," id. at 754, and cited
Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946), as authority for that proposition.
In Utah Junk, however, the Supreme Court construed a procedural provision of
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (expired 1947), that
allowed aggrieved parties to protest governmental price schedules promulgated
under that act "at any time" after the price schedules' effective date. The
Supreme Court determined that a close reading of the statute supported the
conclusion that Congress intended to liberalize the right to challenge the validity of price regulations. The effect of reading the statute strictly was to give the
Emergency Court of Appeals broader jurisdiction; the strict construction rule
did not require a narrow reading of the statute but merely a "close" reading.
Thus, the TECA's conclusion that the strict construction rule requires a narrow
construction of jurisdictional grants is not supported by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Utah Junk.
39. See, e.g., Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum
Corp., 604 F.2d at 183, 186. See also Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip op. at 10 (Temp. Emer. Ct.App. Oct. 15, 1979).
40. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 5, at 14. Although Wright offers this view as
a reason for Congress' reluctance to create specialized courts, it is reasonable
to believe that this view also explains the court's reluctance to allow broad jurisdiction of specialized courts. The experiences of the Commerce Court certainly support this view. Created in 1910, the Commerce Court was quickly
abolished because of allegations that it was dominated by the railroad industry.
Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New FederalIntermediate Appellate Court, 12
U. MICH. J.. REF. 201, 227-28 (1978). This experience created a fear that specialized courts would produce "tunnel visioned judges." Id. Accord, COMMISSION
ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 234-35 (1975).

Other fears were that vested interests might capture a specialized court, id. at
to produce a
235, that exclusive jurisdiction would "reduce the incentive ...
thorough and persuasive opinion in articulation and support of a decision," id.,
and that the quality of appointments would suffer. Id.
41. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 5.
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vision" that other full-time specialized judges have developed
and that Congress has feared.4 2 Although TECA judges are
likely to develop special expertise on ESA and EPAA matters,
that expertise is merely a by-product of the TECA system.
Congress sought to achieve consistency of ESA and EPAA decision making by centralizing appeals arising from those acts in
one tribunal, not by creating a panel of narrowly specialized
judges.4 3 Because the TECA was not designed to reach consistency solely through specialized expertise and because there is
no danger of overspecialization among TECA judges, the general rule requiring strict construction of jurisdictional grants to
specialized courts should not apply to the TECA.
Nonetheless, even nonspecialized courts tend to narrowly
construe statutory grants of jurisdiction. 44 Out of deference to
the constitutionally mandated separation of powers between
the different branches of the government, courts are careful not
to usurp Congress' power to define the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts.4 5 Thus, even if the principle of strict construction of jurisdictional grants to specialized courts does not apply
to the TECA, the broader principle of strict construction arguably does apply to the TECA. But this principle is merely a canon of construction; 4 6 courts should not adhere to this principle
if it frustrates the statutory scheme that provides for jurisdic42. See note 40 supra.
43. See notes 51-53 infra and accompanying text. See also P. CARRINGTON,
D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 36, at 170 ("specialized courts with
generalized judges could assure in some cases a competently expert court,
without the hazards associated with long-term entrenchment in specialties or
the even graver hazards associated with the selection of specialist judges for
duties close to the vital interests of well-organized political groups").
44. "Statutes which deprive a court of jurisdiction are strictly construed,
and when jurisdiction is once granted it will not be deemed taken away by a
[grant of similar jurisdiction to another court]." 3 C. SANDs, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON § 67.03, at 224 (4th ed. 1974) (footnotes omitted). See
Rosecrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 260-63 (1897); United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 159 U.S. 548, 549-50 (1895).
45. Felix Frankfurter acknowledged that[t]he central problem of statutory construction is to ascertain meaning.
But the meaning is to be found by one authority of another's composition. The divorce of the functions of authorship and interpretation becomes of profound importance when such divorce is one of the great
safeguards of a free society. This may sound like a highfalutin way of
referring to the separation of powers. Highfalutin or not, consciously
kept in mind or not, this is the source of the judiciary's problems in
construing legislation.
Frankfurter, A Symposium on Statutory Construction-Foreward,3 VAD. L.
REV. 365, 366 (1950). See also Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REv. 382, 388-89 (1950).
46. See United States v. California, 504 F.2d 750, 754 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).
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tion.47 Strict adherence to this principle has partially frustrated the statutory scheme of the TECA by creating a system
of bifurcated appeals that causes hardship to parties, forced decision making, and inefficient judicial administration. 48
In cases in which the district court has certified substantive
constitutional questions to the TECA, the TECA has not applied the principle of strict construction. Although section
211(c) of the ESA grants the TECA discretion to decide either
the entire case in which the constitutional question arises or
merely the constitutional issues involved, 49 the TECA has invariably taken jurisdiction of the entire case.5 0 These decisions
47. Another policy militates against adherence to this principle when bifurcated appeals would resultThe principle which pervades the modern systems of pleading, especially the federal system, as exemplified by the free permissive joinder
of claims, liberal amendment provisions, and compulsory counterclaims, is that the whole controversy between the parties may and
often must be brought before the same court in the same action.
Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951). Although Williamson involved the application of
res judicata, the opinion evinces the desire that courts and lawmakers have for
convenient, efficient judicial procedure.
This desire is also evident from the increasing willingness of federal courts
to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Although this trend is partially attributable to
the recent creation of federal rights that are coextensive with state rights, it
also derives from the "complexity and expense of modern litigation" which encourages the settlement of disputes between parties in a single suit. Note,
UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction,81 HAnv. L. REv. 657, 657 (1968). In
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1974), the Supreme Court stated: "[I]t is
evident from Gibbs that pendent state claims are not always, or even almost
always, to be dismissed [by the federal courts]. On the contrary, given advantages of economy and convenience, and no unfairness to litigants, Gibbs contemplates adjudication of these claims."
48. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
49. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,
§ 211(c), 85 Stat. 749 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586
(1976).
50. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 537 F.2d 1130, 1137 (Temp Emer. Ct.
App. 1976) ("We do not deal with mere abstractions in responding to certified
constitutional issues.., and we need not close our eyes to pendent considerations or consequences."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Pro
Football, Inc., 514 F.2d 1396, 1397 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) ("[The TECA]
granted the government's motion to have the entire case, both constitutional
and non-constitutional issues, presented to [it] for final disposition."); DeRieux
v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1323 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) ("[The TECA]
granted the joint motion ... to have the entire cases.. . presented to [it] for
consideration."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974); Schertzinger v. Dunlop, 489
F.2d 1307, 1309 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (The TECA exercised discretion
under section 211(c) of the ESA to hear the entire case.); United States v. Ohio,
487 F.2d 936, 938 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (The TECA heard the entire case
from which constitutional issues were certified, but only because the facts were
undisputed and no extensive evidentiary hearing was required.), arfd sub nom.
Fry v. U.S., 421 U.S. 542 (1975); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Dunlop,
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are inconsistent with the TECA's usual refusal to hear nonESA or non-EPAA issues. The TECA's willingness to decide
entire cases in the context of constitutional questions suggests
that an alternative to the issue approach may be feasible in
other cases.
IV.

A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR DEF[NING THE
TECA'S APPELLATE JURISDICTION

The proper scope of the TECA's appellate jurisdiction can
best be analyzed by considering, first, what role Congress intended for the TECA, in light of the legislative history and language of the TECA's jurisdictional grant, and second, what
jurisdictional approach would best enable the TECA to fulfill
that role. The TECA's legislative history indicates that Congress created this emergency court of appeals 51 in response to
the contentions of the TECA's proponents that the entire stabilization program and system of national economic controls
would be jeopardized without special review provisions.5 2
486 F.2d 1388 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (The TECA remanded to the district
court the entire case from which constitutional issues had been improperly certified.). In addition, the TECA has indicated its willingness to hear cases in
which issues of mootness, ripeness, or venue are raised on appeal. See Quincy
Oil, Inc. v. FEA, No. 1-5, (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1980) (mootness); Standard Oil Co. v. DOE, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (ripeness);
Mosely v. Nationwide Purchasing, Inc., 485 F.2d 418 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1973) (venue). The TECA has gone so far as to assume jurisdiction of a case in
which an estoppel defense was the only issue raised on appeal. United States
v. Wickland, No. 9-45 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1980) (claim in district
court based on EPAA). The TECA has thus broadened its "issue" approach.
51. The TECA is the second emergency court that Congress has created.
The first court of appeals was created in 1942, but has since been abolished. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 5, at 14.
52. Two members of the Nixon Administration, John Connally and Charles
E. Walker, made the following arguments in support of the TECA
Cases will be tried at the district court level ....
We propose that the appellate level for all cases under this act consist of one court-the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals ....
The purpose of this court is to provide one focal point for court decisions made under this program. This will avoid inconsistent decisions
and will insure speed of decision by bypassing the crowded dockets of
the circuit courts of appeals. Such a court was used with great success
in earlier price controls efforts.

We believe that these judicial review provisions will make an essential contribution to the fair administration of the program and that
they properly balance the requirements for individual fairness and
prompt determinations with the need for smoothly functioning administrative action.
Hearings on H.R 11309 to Extend and Amend the Economic StabilizationAct of
1970, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
'314 (1971) (statement of John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter
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These review provisions were thought necessary to ensure consistent implementation of the ESA and EPAA, to minimize delay in administering the ESA and EPAA programs, and to
provide relief for persons aggrieved by the operation of those
programs. 53
The plain language of TECA's jurisdictional grant can be
interpreted in two ways. In that grant Congress used the
phrase "cases and controversies arising under" the ESA or the
EPAA.54 If Congress used the phrase as a term of art, it mandates traditional arising under jurisdiction for the TECA and
therefore only issues raised in the complaint may be considcited as House Hearings]; Economic Stabilization Legislation: Hearings on
S.2712 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1971) (statement of Charles E. Walker, Under Secretary,
Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
David Ginsburg, former General Counsel of the Office of Price Administration, stated: 'The objective is certainly to have a single court of appeals to review cases wherever they arise throughout the country. This enables a single
policy to be established, a single price policy or wage policy, for the entire
country." Senate Hearings, supra, at 127 (statement of David Ginsburg, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.).
One apparent exception to this objective appears in the final version of the
bill. As originally introduced in the House and Senate, the bill creating the
TECA provided that ESA actions could originate only in the federal district
courts. S.2712, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 (1971); H.R. 11309, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 208 (1971). Later, a provision was incorporated in the bill providing that
courts of competent jurisdiction-including state courts-could hear cases in
which ESA issues are raised as a defense. This provision was included in the
final version of the bill passed by both Houses. Economic Stabilization Act
Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211(a), 85 Stat. 748 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586 (1976). The Joint Conference Committee, when adopting the provision, stated that the "Conferees felt that the...
provisions would facilitate efficient and equitable administration of the Act."
HR. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 15th Sess. 20-21, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 2310 (Conference Report- Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Comm. of Conference). Questioning before. the Senate committee established that the senators were concerned about the inconvenience that would be
caused to their constituents by requiring that even the most insignificant ESA
issues be heard in federal district court. Senate Hearings, supra, at 33-34
(statement of John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury [dialogue between
Senator Thomas McIntyre and L Patrick Gray III, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, Department of Justice]); Senate Hearings,supra,at 56-57 (statement of Alan Cranston, U.S. Senator from California [dialogue between Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, and Charles E. Walker, Under Secretary, Department of the
Treasury]). The senators were also concerned about the work load that would
be placed on the district court without that provision. Senate Hearings, supra,
at 50-51 (statement of Charles E. Walker, Under Secretary, Department of the
Treasury [dialogue between Senator Robert Taft and L.Patrick Gray II, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice]).
53. See note 52 supra; S. REP. No. 507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in
[1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2283, 2292.

54. See note 7 supra.
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ered.5 5 If, however, Congress intended that the phrase retain
its ordinary meaning, it mandates jurisdiction for the TECA in
any case containing an ESA or EPAA issue. 56 As the Coastal
States court indicates, limiting the TECA to traditional arising
under jurisdiction contravenes the reason for creating the
TECA.57 If the TECA may consider only the issues raised in
the complaint, ESA or EPAA issues raised in a counterclaim or
defense would be considered by the circuit court. Such a system would undermine the goals of consistent decision making
for ESA and EPAA matters. The remaining approach, case jurisdiction, is most likely to achieve the goal of consistent decision making.5 8 Under a case approach, the TECA would take
jurisdiction over any case involving an ESA or EPAA issue,
whether raised by complaint, answer, counterclaim, or otherwise.5 9 But as the Coastal States court correctly noted, unlimited case jurisdiction would be overly inclusive. 60 ESA or
EPAA issues raised in the district court may be frivolous or unrelated to the central issues on appeal and may have no effect
on the court's decision. Giving the TECA jurisdiction over such
issues would serve the purpose of consistency, but would burden the TECA with many cases in which the major issues are
unrelated to the ESA or the EPAA,61 and would frustrate the
goal of efficiency.
A grant of limited case jurisdiction, however, would be consistent with both the plain language of the TECA's jurisdictional grant and the goals of consistent, efficient decision
making. Limited case jurisdiction would require the TECA to
decide the entire case on appeal, including issues not arising
under the ESA or the EPAA, but only if an ESA or EPAA issue
had been adjudicated by the district court. Adoption of this ap55. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
57. 604 F.2d at 183-87. One court has adopted this approach. See St. Mary's
Hosp. v. Ogilvie, 496 F.2d 1324, 1326 (7th Cir. 1974). The special court created by
section 209 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. § 719 (1976), has
also rejected the "well pleaded complaint rule." See Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Illinois, 423 F. Supp. 941, 947 (Spec. Ct. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977).
58. The Coastal States Court indirectly admitted that only the case jurisdiction approach could further the goals of speed and consistency. See 604 F.2d
at 183, 184. Although the Coastal States opinion does not adequately discuss
the case jurisdiction approach, it does fully discuss the issue jurisdiction approach.
59. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
60. 604 F.2d at 183, 187.
61. The unlimited case approach "withdraws from the courts of appeals
many non-ESA issues, which may really be the dominant issues in the case."
Id. at 183. See also id. at 187.
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proach would avoid the problems of unlimited case jurisdiction
by eliminating cases that contain unimportant ESA or EPAA
issues, while ensuring the necessary consistency that is sacrificed under the "arising under" approach.
The limited case approach would also avoid many of the
problems associated with bifurcated appeals, 62 and thus help
achieve the congressional goals of consistency, minimal delay,
and relief for aggrieved persons. The limited case approach
would end the confusion that is caused by the issue approach,
since there is no need to separate issues and decide the proper
forum for each issue. Under the limited case approach, litigants would merely need to determine whether the district
court has adjudicated an ESA or EPAA issue. If such an issue
has been adjudicated, the litigants could be confident that the
TECA would have jurisdiction over the entire appeal. Moreover, because the TECA would review the entire case, litigants
would not have to argue the same case before two different
courts. The limited case approach would also eliminate the
forced decision making that is inevitable under a system of bifurcated appeals whenever the TECA and a circuit court must
decide nearly identical but severed issues. 63 Under a limited
case system, the TECA would decide both issues. Because jurisdiction of the cases involving adjudicated ESA or EPAA issues would be entirely in the TECA, the delay, resulting when
proceedings in either the TECA or a circuit court must be
stayed pending the decision of related issues in the other
court 64 as well as when different courts must decide where jurisdiction exists,65 will be eliminated.
The application of limited case jurisdiction would be relatively simple and would resemble jurisdictional allocations
often made by courts in other contexts. To determine whether
limited case jurisdiction is appropriate, the court must employ
a two-part inquiry. First, it must inquire whether the issue actually arises under the ESA or the EPAA, and second, whether
the district court actually adjudicated the issue. The first inquiry is necessary whenever courts are specialized in subject
62. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
63. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
64. See note 35 supra.
65. For example, the problems in Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l, 490 F.2d 133, 139
(10th Cir. 1973), ce t denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974), see text accompanying note 34
supra, would be solved under a limited case approach. In Gordon, the TECA
would have heard all appealed issues joined with an appealed, adjudicated
ESA or EPAA issue.
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matter, regardless of the jurisdictional approach taken.66 The
67
Supreme Court's reasoning in Bray v. United States illustrates how courts would approach this inquiry. In Bray, the
Court held that because the defendant's conviction for criminal
contempt did not depend on the "existence of [ESA] violations
or even the continuation of the investigation" into such viola68
tions, the contempt conviction was a separate proceeding.
Thus, because the contempt issues did not arise under the
ESA, TECA review was not warranted. Similarly, the only issues adjudicated by the district court and appealed to the
TECA in Clark Oil & Refining Company v. Department of Energy 69 arose under statutes other than the ESA or the EPAA.
Under a limited case approach, the TECA therefore wquld not
have jurisdiction over the appeal.
The inquiry into whether the district court adjudicated a
TECA issue is best exemplified by the Second Circuit's decision in Coastal States. This case held that the TECA was the
appropriate forum for appealed issues when a district court
judge decided an ESA issue while ruling on a motion to vacate
the district court judgment.7 0 Under the Coastal States rationale, an ESA or EPAA issue should be viewed as "adjudicated"
when the district court rules on an ESA or EPAA issue that
materially affects the outcome of the case. Courts are accustomed to making such decisions, so this requirement should
1
create no new problems.7
The limited case approach is not without difficulties. These
problems, however, seem insignificant when compared to the
problems that the limited case approach avoids. First, the workload of the TECA could increase because, in addition to the
ESA or EPAA issues currently heard by the TECA, the TECA
would also hear issues that are now reviewed by the circuit
courts. It is possible that as the TECA's work load increases,
66. See generally cases cited in note 31 supra.
67. 423 U.S. 73 (1975) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 76.
69. No. DC-53 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979), discussed in note 15
supra and accompanying text.
70. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604
F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1979).
71. The circuit courts can only hear appeals from final decisions of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Such a requirement is very similar to the
adjudication requirement of the limited case approach. Though defining finality is sometimes difficult, the "saving grace of the imprecise rule of finality is
that in almost all situations it is entirely clear, either from the nature of the order or from a crystallized body of decisions, that a particular order is or is not
finaL" C. WRiGHT, supra note 21, § 101, at 505 (footnote omitted).
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TECA decisions would be delayed, thwarting the goal of timely
decision making. The limited case approach would, however,
increase the number of issues that the TECA must decide only
in cases in which appeals are now bifurcated. Given the relatively small number of bifurcated appeals each year, the real
increase in the number of issues for the TECA's consideration
would not be great. 72 Moreover, because the TECA's docket is
not nearly as crowded as a circuit court docket, even with some
increase in the TECA's work load the TECA would still be able
to process cases much faster than the circuit courts.7 3 If the
TECA is allowed to decide all issues in a case, it is likely that
parties aggrieved by the operation of the ESA or the EPAA will
receive quicker review of all issues appealed than they now receive, thus furthering the congressional policy of "individual
72. Since the TECA's inception in 1971, it has decided 284 cases. Director,
Administrative Office, United States Courts, Annual Report, 207, 208 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Annual Report]. Of these, only a handful resulted in bifurcated appeals. See cases cited in note 11 supra.
73. Fifty-one TECA cases were docketed in 1979 as compared with 35 cases
docketed in 1978. In 1978, TECA disposed of 17 cases. In 1979, TECA disposed
of 34 cases. As of Sept. 30, 1979, 33 cases were pending before the TECA. Chief
Judge Tamm reports that 35 to 50 cases are appealed to TECA yearly and that
the case flow is steady. There are usually two cases awaiting opinions and
seven cases scheduled for hearings at all times. Hearings for all TECA cases
occur within two months of the date on which cases were filed with the TECA.
This swift disposition of cases is partly because the time allowed for filing
briefs and answers for TECA appeals is one-half the time allowed for filing
briefs and answers in circuit courts. Letter from TECA Chief Judge Tamm to
Director, Administrative Office, United States Courts, reprinted in Annual Report, supra note 72.
In the more than seven years of the TECA's existence, TECA opinions
were not rendered within three months of TECA hearings in only four cases,
one of which involved sums of $1.3 billion. Given these figures and the relatively small number of cases involving non-ESA/EPAA issues that would be
heard by the TECA if the TECA were to adopt a limited case approach, it is
difficult to imagine that using a limited case approach would significantly affect
the TECA's admirable case disposition record.
Circuit court dockets are much more crowded. From August 1978 to September 1979, 21,127 appeals were filed in the circuit courts. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistical Analysis and Reports Division,
Federal Judicial Workload Statistics 1 (1979) (for the twelve-month period
ending September 30, 1979). As of September 30, 1979, 18,695 cases were terminated and 19,615 were left pending. Id. As of September 30, 1979, 525 cases
were held under submission (after hearings but awaiting opinions) in the
courts of appeals and the court of claims for more than three months; 288 such
cases had been submitted for more than three but less than six months
(54.9%); 154 such cases had been submitted for more than six but less than
nine months (29.3%); 45 such cases had been submitted for more than nine
months but less than a year (8.6%); 38 such cases had been submitted for more
than one full year (7.2%). The District of Columbia, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
led the other circuits with 65, 158, and 75 cases held under submission, respectively. Id. at 15.
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fairness and prompt determination." 74
Second, increasing the TECA's work load would probably
require TECA judges to spend more time deciding TECA cases
than they now spend. This problem, however, would probably
not be severe since the real increase in the TECA's work load
would be minimal. Moreover, if the time commitments became
too burdensome, the Chief Justice could exercise the power
7
given him by Congress to appoint new members to the court.
It might appear that the extra time that judges would spend on
TECA matters could force the judges to be more narrowly specialized. 76 Such narrow specialization is, however, unlikely because any additional issues the TECA would decide under the
limited case approach would be general issues that the circuit
77
courts now decide.
Third, use of a limited case approach could also cause jurisdictional problems when cases on appeal involve issues arising
under two regulatory statutes, which both contain specific judicial review provisions. 78 For example, in Municipal Electric
Utilities Association v. FederalPower Commission,79 the court
was faced with issues arising under both the Federal Power Act
(FPA)and the EPAA. The FPA provides for appellate review
of Federal Power Commission orders in the courts of appeals
74. See note 52 supra;text accompanying note 53 supra.
75. Economic Stabilization Act of 1971, Pub. Law No. 92-210, § 211(b)(1), 85
Stat. 749 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586 (1976) (incorporated in EPAA, 15 U.S.C. 754(a) (1) (Supp. 1979)).
76. For a description of the problems involved in judicial overspecialization, see note 40 supra.
77. A further problem could occur under a limited case approach if the district court ignores key ESA or EPAA issues. Because this approach allows the
TECA to hear only cases in which ESA or EPAA issues have been adjudicated,
the TECA's primary function of settling ESA and EPAA issues would be frustrated if such issues were ignored. This problem is not, however, unique to a
limited case approach; under the TECA's current issue approach, the TECA
must also determine whether the district court has adjudicated an ESA or
EPAA issue. See Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum
Corp., 604 F.2d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 1979). If the Problem arises, the TECA could
apply the approach circuit courts employ when mitigating the analogous problem of district courts ignoring important issues. See C. WRIGHrT, supra note 21,
§ 104, at 523 ("[a]n appellee in a circuit court may defend a judgment on any
ground consistent with the record, even if rejected by the lower court") (footnote omitted). See also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479
(1976).
78. See, e.g., Newell v. FEA, 591 F.2d 704 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979); Connecticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Groton v. Federal Power Comm'n, 487 F.2d 927 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973);
Municipal Elec. Util. Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 485 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
79. 485 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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for the circuit where a party is located or in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 80 Using the issue approach, the Circuit Court stated that an "entirely harmonious accommodation
of the two pertinent Congressional enactments can be achieved
by dual review of [the FPC] order... ,each tribunal acting
within the sphere of its statutorily defined exclusive jurisdiction."8 m But using a limited case approach, the TECA would
have heard the entire case. This would arguably be an unwarranted assumption of the circuit courts' jurisdiction over FPA
issues. There is, however, evidence that the TECA could properly assume jurisdiction of Federal Power Act issues. The circuit courts hear such issues only when such an assumption of
jurisdiction would not "constitute an embarassment to the separate jurisdiction of the District Court [and the TECA]" under
the ESA.82 Moreover, circuit courts already defer to the TECA
when FPA issues are inextricably intertwined with ESA or
EPAA issues, holding their review in abeyance until TECA review of the case is finished.83 By allowing the TECA to initially
decide which issues it will hear and by recognizing the primary
importance of determining ESA or EPAA issues quickly,84 the
circuit courts appear willing to allow the TECA to assume limited case jurisdiction. In the context of the Natural Gas Act,
the District of Columbia Circuit has resolved a similar conflict
in appellate review provisions in favor of the TECA, reasoning
inter alia that because the ESA deals with the matter of appeals in "specific" terms, it must override a general statutory
jurisdictional grant of review to the circuit court.8 5 From a
practical standpoint, the problems associated with bifurcated
80. 16 U.S.C. § 825(1), (p) (1976).
81. 485 F.2d at 971.
82. Id.
83. Connecticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 993, 998
(D.C. Cir. 1974). By allowing the TECA to decide such appeals, the circuit
courts disregard the judicial review provisions of the Federal Power Act.
84. In Connecticut Municipal Group, the District of Columbia Circuit apparently originally refused to hear any of the appeal because the Federal
Power Act question "appeared so integrated into an analysis of the purpose
and legislative intent of the [ESA] that its extraction and separate review
would have frustrated the goals... contemplated by the ESA." Id. at 997. See
also Municipal Intervenors Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 473 F.2d 84, 89-90
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
85. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, No. 77-1511, slip op. at 4 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1980). One
commentator has stated that "[i]t is not so clear that TECA's exercise of pendent jurisdiction over Natural Gas claims would have done violence to the will
of Congress." Theis, Pendent JurisdictionOver Claims Arising Under Federal
Law (publication forthcoming in HastingsL.J. (manuscript, 44)).
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appeals,8 6 which may frustrate the dual congressional purposes
of prompt, consistent resolution of ESA or EPAA issues and of
relief for persons aggrieved by the operation of either act, also
justify TECA limited case jurisdiction even when other regulatory statutes are involved.
V. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TECA'S
JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH
The issue approach that has been chosen to resolve the
TECA's jurisdictional problems has other important implications beyond those it creates for the TECA. Pending legislation
evinces a trend toward establishing more specialized subject
matter courts to deal with complex, technical areas of the law.87
The pending legislation would create two specialized tribunals:
one would review patent appeals and appeals involving claims
against the federal government, 88 and the other would review
tax appeals. 8 9 As with the TECA, the problem of defining the
jurisdiction of these courts will inevitably arise.
The proposal dealing with patent appeals would create a
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction of all civil patent cases now appealable both
to the circuit courts from the federal district courts, and to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals from the Patent and
Trademark Office administrative board. The Federal Circuit
Court would also hear appeals of nearly all claims currently
within the existing Court of Claims appellate jurisdiction.90
86. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
87. The legislation originated in the Senate as S. 677 and S. 678, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). The current version of the bills is S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); S. 1477 is explained and summarized in S. REP. No. 304, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). The sponsors of the Senate bills were Senators Kennedy and
DeConcini. S. 1477 passed in the Senate on October 30, 1979, and was referred
to the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts. No formal House
action has yet been taken on S. 1477. The legislation is patterned after a proposal by Charles R. Haworth and Daniel J. Meador, although it differs from that
proposal in certain important respects. See Haworth & Meador, supra note 40,
at 201. The most important difference is that the Meador proposal would give
jurisdiction of tax cases, environmental cases, claims against the government,
and patent cases to one court. Id. at 225.
88. Sections 301 through 354 of S. 1477 deal with patent appeals and the abolition of the Court of Claims.
89. Sections 401 through 407 of S. 1477 deal with tax appeals. Sections 501
through 509 deal with technical and conforming amendments relating to the
proposed courts. Sections 601 and 602 set the effective date of the bill and the
orderly transition to the new patent and tax case appellate system.
90. The jurisdiction of the new Federal Circuit Court is described at S.
REP. No. 304, supra note 87, at 35-37. The Senate report also states:
The bill creates an article MI court that is similar in structure to the
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The proposal dealing with tax appeals would create a United
States Court of Tax Appeals with exclusive jurisdiction of civil
tax cases now appealable both to the federal circuit courts of
appeals and to the Tax Court. Current Court of Claims jurisdiction over tax cases would be eliminated under the proposal.91 The administration of patent and tax law would be
improved by providing for centralized, uniform patent and tax
92
appeals decisions.
Inconsistent interpretations of these legislative proposals
indicate that confusion about the proper jurisdictional boundaries for these proposed courts already exists. 93 Because the
courts which would be created by the pending legislation would
eleven other courts of appeals. It is composed of the twelve judgeships
of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
which become United States circuit judgeships; those courts are abolished by the merger. The new court is on line with other Federal
courts of appeals; that is, it is not a new tier in the judicial structure.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit differs from other
Federal courts of appeals, however, in that its jurisdiction is defined in
terms of subject matter rather than geography.
Id. at 8-9.
For a detailed discussion of current appellate procedure in patent cases
and the current jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, see Haworth & Meador,
supra note 40, at 201, 215-17, 220-24 (1978).
91. The jurisdiction of the new Court of Tax Appeals is described in S.
REP. No. 304, supra note 87, at 39-41. The jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals was summarized as follows:
To solve the problems surrounding the resolution of civil tax issues, S. 1477 proposes two major changes in present law.
1. The creation of a United States Court of Tax Appeals with
exclusive jurisdiction over civil tax appeals from the district
court and the Tax Court; and
2. The elimination of Court of Claims jurisdiction over tax

cases.
By virtue of these changes, all civil tax cases would be initiated in either the United States Tax Court or district courts and all civil tax appeals would be heard by the newly created Court of Tax Appeals.
Although the decisions of the new court would be subject to review by
the Supreme Court on certiorari, it is anticipated that such review
would be a rare occurrence. For all practical purposes, the new Court

of Tax Appeals would become the final authority in the judicial interpretation of the Federal internal revenue laws.
Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
92. See id. at 8, 16-17.
93. Although the Senate Report seems to require the Federal Circuit Court
to hear entire cases, id. at 13, an indication that the Federal Circuit Court
would have case jurisdiction is made in the context of reassuring skeptics that
Federal Circuit Court judges would not be unduly specialized. The jurisdiction
of the Court of Tax Appeals is even more ambiguous because the judges would
sit part-time on that court (as do TECA judges), id. at 19, and would have to
constantly "consider questions of property, contracts, agency, partnerships, corporations, equity, trusts, [and] procedure ... if they [were] ever to deal effectively with the many problems that make up modern tax law." Haworth &
Meador, supra note 40, at 228-29 n.169. Since tax cases contain a variety of is-
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closely resemble the TECA,94 it is likely that these new courts
might follow the TECA's example and assume an issue apTo avoid this possibility, Congress
proach to jurisdiction.
should carefully draft the jurisdictional provisions so that these
new courts will not create additional bifurcated appellate systems by narrowly interpreting statutory grants of jurisdiction.
Although a trend toward the establishment of specialized
courts may be inevitable because of the increasingly technical
and complicated nature of the law, an associated trend toward
the establishment of bifurcated appellate systems can and
should be avoided.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In cases involving issues that do not arise under the ESA
or the EPAA, the TECA's statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction is unclear. Courts have decided that in such cases the
TECA's jurisdiction should be confined to the issues that arise
under the ESA or the EPAA, thus necessitating the bifurcation
of cases on appeal. This system of bifurcated appeals has resulted in confusion, hardship for litigants, forced decision making, and delay.
sues, the proposed Court of Tax Appeals would certainly be compelled to
choose between "issue" and "case" jurisdiction, just as the TECA has done.
Haworth and Meador have indicated that their proposed court, would have
jurisdiction of all ancillary or pendent matters making up the patent, environmental, tax or government claims cases before the new court. Haworth & Meador, supra note 40, at 225, 228 & n.169; Meador, A ProposalFor a New Federal
IntermediateAppellate Court,60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 665, 673 (1978). Other commentators, however, have paraphrased Meador as suggesting that "cases, such
as antitrust defenses to the main patent action, would not go to the new Court."
Miller, Future of the CCPA, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 676, 678 (1978).
94. The TECA resembles both the Haworth-Meador and the KennedyDeConcini proposals. Because TECA judges assume only part-time TECA
duty, they are generalists. Such a characteristic was important in both proposals. All three jurisdictional schemes also provide courts with subject matter jurisdiction over certain kinds of cases, and thus each court must determine how
much of an appeal Congress intended it to hear.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals may need to apply limited case jurisdiction even more than the TECA or the Haworth-Meador proposed court. Although bifurcated appeals should be avoided in any event, the judges in
Kennedy's proposed Circuit Court would hear only two kinds of claims-patent
and government claims cases. Although the variety and general nature of government claims cases guarantees that Kennedy's Federal Circuit Court judges
would be generalists to some degree, the patent cases may demand a much
higher percentage of the judges' time. If the issue jurisdiction of patent cases
is given to this court, these judges would become even more specialized than
they already are. Since they are capable of handling nonpatent claims, as
demonstrated by the jurisdictional grant of governmental claims appeals, they
should do so to help perserve their generalist standing and judicial integrity.
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The analysis that courts have used to support the current
definition of the TECA's jurisdiction is flawed by a failure to
consider the approaches to the TECA's jurisdiction that would
better serve the TECA's objectives and by an inappropriate adherence to the doctrine of strict construction of jurisdictional
grants to specialized courts. Consideration of the TECA's objective to provide a remedy for parties aggrieved by operation
of the ESA or the EPAA in a prompt and consistent manner
supports the conclusion that a limited case approach most appropriately defines the TECA's appellate jurisdiction. Under
this approach, the TECA would take jurisdiction of all issues in
a case if the district court had adjudicated any ESA or EPAA
issue. Such an approach would eliminate the problems caused
by bifurcated appeals and could be easily administered by the
courts. Although the limited case approach may cause certain
problems, including an increase in the TECA's work load and
an assumption of jurisdiction over issues arising under other
regulatory acts, these problems are minimal compared to the
problems caused by other approaches. In view of pending legislation that would create specialized courts closely resembling
the TECA, it is important that the problems surrounding the
TECA's jurisdiction be remedied to provide an effective model
for the proposed courts.

